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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 900217-CA

v.
Category No. 2

TIMOTHY KEVIN DUNCAN,
Defendant-Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from convictions of theft by deception,
a class B misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1990),
and receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court
correctly prohibited defendant from impeaching a prosecution
witness with a prior conviction.
M

[T]rial court rulings on the admissibility of evidence

are not to be overturned in the absence of a clear abuse of
discretion."

State v. Griffiths, 752 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah 1988).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issue presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Timothy Kevin Duncan, was charged with
receiving stolen property, a second degree felony, under Utah
Code Ann. § 76-6-408 (1990), and theft by deception, a class B
misdemeanor, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405 (1990) (R. 6-7).
After a jury trial, defendant was found guilty as
charged (R. 67-68).

The trial court sentenced defendant to the

Utah State Prison for concurrent terms of one to fifteen years
for the felony conviction and six months for the misdemeanor
conviction, those terms to run consecutively to sentences
defendant was then serving (R. 77).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
For purposes of the issue raised on appeal, the
pertinent facts are those set out above in the Statement of the
Case and below in the argument portion of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
prohibiting defendant from impeaching a prosecution witness with
a prior conviction that was not admissible under rule 509, Utah
Rules of Evidence.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN PROHIBITING
DEFENDANT FROM IMPEACHING A PROSECUTION
WITNESS WITH A PRIOR CONVICTION THAT WAS NOT
ADMISSIBLE UNDER RULE 609, UTAH RULES OF
EVIDENCE.
Prior to trial, defendant sought a ruling from the
trial court allowing him to impeach the prosecution's chief
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witness with a prior conviction under rule 609(a)(1), Utah Rules
of Evidence (T. 75-80).

The court denied the motion, concluding

that the conviction was not one which could be used to impeach
the witness under rule 609(a) because it was a misdemeanor
conviction not punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year
and did not involve a crime of dishonesty or false statement (T.
81).

It stated:
The Court concludes that the order of May
2nd, 1986, signed by Judge Sawaya is the
actual conviction. And that on its face
indicates that the crime is Attempted
Unlawful Distribution for Value of a
Controlled Substance, a Class A Misdemeanor.
Accordingly, under 609(a), the Court
concludes that it is not a conviction
involving imprisonment for over one year.
So, for that reason, I will not allow you to
use that for impeachment purposes.

(T. 81).
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred
in not allowing impeachment based on the prior conviction.

He

claims that the witness's conviction of attempted unlawful
distribution for value of a controlled substance, which was based
on a guilty plea and entered as a conviction of a class A
misdemeanor pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402(1) (1990),
should have been treated as a felony conviction for purposes of
rule 609(a).
According to the representations of defense counsel in
the trial court, the prosecution's chief witness, Mike Skillings,
had been charged with unlawful distribution for value of a
controlled substance, a second degree felony.

He pleaded guilty

to the lesser charge of attempted unlawful distribution of a
-3-

controlled substance, a third degree felony, and the trial court
entered a conviction for that offense as a class A misdemeanor
pursuant to section 76-3-402(1) (T. 76-77).
Rule 609(a) provides:
For the purpose of attacking the
credibility of a witness, evidence that he
has been convicted of a crime shall be
admitted if elicited from him or established
by public record during cross-examination but
only if the crime (1) was punishable by death
or imprisonment in excess of one year under
the law under which he was convicted, and the*
court determines that the probative value of
admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2)
involved dishonesty or false statement,
regardless of the punishment.
The rule focuses on a prior conviction and refers specifically to
the "law under which [the witness] was convicted."

Thus, the

specific question presented here is whether the trial court
correctly concluded that Skillings's prior conviction was a
misdemeanor conviction not punishable by imprisonment in excess
of one year and therefore inadmissible under rule 609(a)(1).
There appears to be no dispute that Skillings's prior
conviction of attempted unlawful distribution for value of a
controlled substance resulted from his entry of a guilty plea to
a charge of that third degree offense.

However, contrary to

defendant's view, Skillings's guilty plea did not in itself
constitute a conviction; it was nothing more than "an
Neither the order signed by Judge Sawaya with respect to
Skillings's prior conviction nor any documentation of the plea
entered by Skillings appears in the record before this Court.
However, because the prosecutor did not disagree with defense
counsel's representations regarding those matters in the trial
court (T. 75-81), the State will assume that what defense counsel
represented was accurate.
-4-

acknowledgment that the accused is guilty of the offense
charged."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-2(1) (1990).

The relevant

reference point for rule 609(a) is not the guilty plea but rather
the judgment of conviction that was entered.
Section 76-3-402(1) provides:
If the court, having regard for the nature
and circumstances of the offense of which the
defendant was found guilty and to the history
and character of the defendant, concludes
that it would be unduly harsh to record the
conviction as being for that category of
offense established by statute and to
sentence the defendant to an alternative
normally applicable to that offense, the
court may, unless otherwise specifically
provided by law, enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower category of
offense and impose sentence accordingly.
[Emphasis added.]
Although Skillings pleaded guilty to a third degree felony
charge, his conviction, entered as a "judgment of conviction" by
the court under section 76-3-402(1), was for a class A
misdemeanor.

That statute does not merely allow the court to

sentence a defendant to a sentence associated with a lower
category offense, it allows the court to "enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower category offense."

In fact, in

Skillings's case, the court entered a judgment of conviction for
a class A misdemeanor.

Therefore, under the plain language of

section 76-3-402(1) and the court's judgment, Skillings's prior
conviction was for a category of offense that was not punishable
by imprisonment in excess of one year.

See Utah Code Ann. § 76-

3-204(1) (1990) (class A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment
for a term not exceeding one year).

-5-

That the judgment of conviction is the relevant
reference point rather than the guilty plea is supported by State
v. Theison# 709 P.2d 307 (Utah 1985) (per curiam).

There, in

declining to address the defendant's challenge to the district
court's denial of his petition for expungement of his arrest and
conviction because there was an inadequate record on appeal, the
Utah Supreme Court said:
Our examination of the record fails to
disclose any conviction of defendant to be
expunged. The minute entry of his May 9,
1980 arraignment indicates that upon
defendant's guilty plea to "THEFT 2nd
Degree," the matter was merely continued for
sentence and defendant referred to the
probation department for a presentence
report. The subsequent minute entry of May
23, 1980, provides only that at the time set
for the sentence on the felony charge the
trial court placed defendant on probation
under the supervision of the probation
department. There is nothing in the record
before this Court to show any acceptance of
the guilty plea, findings, conviction,
judgment, or imposition of sentence by the
lower court upon defendant.
Without any indication in the record of
the proceedings below concerning the
disposition of the second degree felony
charge against defendant, we cannot determine
in what manner the court acted. It is
possible that the court intended to enter
defendant's conviction, impose sentence which
was stayed, and place defendant on probation.
But the record does not so indicate.
709 P.2d at 308 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

It is

obvious from the foregoing that the supreme court did not
consider the entry of a guilty plea to be a conviction; after
entry of the plea, there is no conviction until the court has
accepted the plea and entered a judgment of conviction.
Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5).

See also

Theison makes equally clear that section
-6-

76-3-402 is not merely a sentencing statute, for it "allows a
court the discretion in appropriate cases to enter a conviction
for the 'next lower category of offense and impose sentence
accordingly.'"

^d. at 308 n.l (emphasis added).

State v. Delashmuttf 676 P.2d 383 (Utah 1983) (per
curiam), cited by defendant in support of his contention that a
guilty plea standing alone constitutes a conviction, is not
inconsistent with this view.

In that case the supreme court

obviously assumed that the defendant's prior guilty plea had been
accepted by the trial court and a judgment of conviction had been
entered on the plea at the time sentence was imposed.
384.

j[d. at

And, insofar as United States v. Turner, 497 F.2d 406 (10th

Cir. 1974), cert, denied, 423 U.S. 848 (1975), which construed
Oklahoma law, may suggest a different conclusion, it is
inconsistent with Theison and the plain language of section 76-3402(1) and rule 609(a).

Furthermore, Turner by no means

expresses the only view on the subject. As noted in United
States v. Klein, 560 F.2d 1236 (5th Cir. 1977), cert, denied, 434
U.S. 1073 (1978) (holding that a verdict of guilty where judgment
and sentence have not been entered is admissible for impeachment
purposes under Fed. R. Evid. 609):
By this holding we intimate no view as to
the admissibility for impeachment purposes of
pleas of guilty standing alone without a
judgment of conviction and imposition of
sentence. At least one circuit has held that
"a guilty plea is a confession of guilt and
amounts to a conviction" for impeachment
purposes, United States v. Turner, supra, 497
F.2d at 407, while other circuits have held
otherwise. United States v. Lee, 166
U.S.App.D.C. 67, 509 F.2d 40[0] (1974);
United States v. Semenson, 421 F.2d 1206 (2d
Cir. 1970).
-7-

560 F.2d at 1241.

Indeed, generally when courts refer to guilty

pleas for purposes of impeachment under rule 609(a), they talk
about guilty pleas that have resulted in conviction.

For

example, as the court stated in United States v. Pardo, 636 F.2d
535 (D.C. Cir. 1980):
A guilty plea which results in conviction
is of course fully equivalent for impeachment
purposes to a determination of guilt
following trial. A guilty plea is thus fully
admissible for impeachment purposes, assuming
the prerequisites of Rule 609 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence are satisfied.
636 F.2d at 545-46 n.32 (citation omitted; emphasis added).

See

also Trindle v. Sonat Marine Inc., 697 F. Supp. 879, 881 n.4
(E.D. Pa. 1988); Tussell v. Witco Chemical Corp., 555 F. Supp.
979, 981 n.3 (W.D. Pa. 1983).

Cf. State v. Cash, 40 Ohio St.3d

116, 532 N.E.2d 111, 113 (1988) (guilty plea constituted prior
conviction which could be used for impeachment, even though
pronouncement of sentence still pending).
Thus, the trial court correctly ruled that Shillings's
prior misdemeanor conviction was not admissible to impeach him
under rule 609(a).

See State v. Bruce, 779 P.2d 646, 653 (Utah

1989) ("convictions for crimes not involving dishonesty or false
statement cannot be used for impeachment purposes in Utah unless
they are felony convictions and the trial court has applied the
proper balancing test under . . . rule [609]"); State v. Brown,

In addition to ruling that the prior conviction was not
punishable by imprisonment in excess of one year, the court ruled
that it was not a conviction of a crime which involved dishonesty
or false statement (see rule 609(a)(2)) (T. 81). Defendant does
not argue that the prior conviction, even if for a misdemeanor,
was nevertheless admissible under rule 609(a)(2).
-8-

771 P.2d 1093, 1094 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (under rule 609(a),
trial court improperly ruled that the defendant's prior
misdemeanor convictions of theft were admissible for impeachment
without first determining whether they involved dishonesty or
false statement); State v. Morehouse, 748 P.2d 217, 221 (Utah Ct.
App.) ("Under subsection (a)(1) of Rule 609, the DUI conviction
was not admissible because not punishable by more than one year's
imprisonment."), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (1988).

See also

United States v. Nichols, 808 F.2d 660, 664 (8th Cir.) (trial
court properly refused to allow the defendant to question FBI
agent, the government's principal witness, about a traffic
conviction for DUI; because conviction did not permit
imprisonment greater than one year and crime did not involve
dishonesty or false statement, it was not admissible under rule
609(a), Federal Rules of Evidence), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1038
(1987); United States v. Lane, 708 F.2d 1394, 1398 (9th Cir.
1983) (district court did not err in excluding evidence of
government witness's prior arson conviction where witness had
withdrawn original guilty plea to felony and had pleaded guilty
3
to lesser included misdemeanor offense).
The court's ruling
serves both the purpose of section 76-3-402(1) (i.e., entry of a
conviction for a higher category offense should not be made when,
"having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense of
which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and

The appellate courts of this state look to the interpretation
of the federal rules of evidence by the federal courts to aid in
interpreting Utah's rules of evidence. State v. Banner, 717 P.2d
1325, 1333-34 (Utah 1986).
-9-

character of the defendant," such would be "unduly harsh") and of
rule 609(a) (i.e., limiting the admissibility of prior
convictions for impeachment).
Because defendant fails in his challenge to the trial
court's determination that Skillings's prior conviction was a
misdemeanor conviction which could not be used for impeachment
under rule 609(a), his additional point regarding the need to
perform the weighing function required in certain circumstances
under rule 609(a)(1) need not be addressed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should
affirm defendant's convictions.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this

/&?£*>day of October,

1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

DAVID B. THOMPSON
U
Assistant Attorney General
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